Nuclear Jordan

Interesting op-ed in today's New York Times. Yossi Beilin, a former Israeli official, argues that the US should allow Jordan to enrich its own uranium as part of its push to produce nuclear power.

Israel, despite having warmer relations with Jordan than with any Arab state, fears that in-country enrichment will give its Hashemite neighbor the expertise needed to produce a nuclear weapon. Never mind that Jordan has the right to enrich uranium under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (which Israel has not signed). Never mind that Jordan is closely allied with the US and other western countries. Ignore the fact that "the king has continuously affirmed his willingness for transparency on all matters relating to the production of nuclear power plants." Regardless of context, Arabs + uranium = unacceptable, in Israel's eyes. Mr. Beilin wisely argues against this paranoid view of Israel's security situation. 

On almost every issue, I agree with Mr. Beilin. Jordan has the right to enrich uranium, and given the large reserves recently discovered in the country (11th largest in the world), buying other people's uranium seems a foolish waste of money. More generally, if Israel isn't comfortable with nuclear power in Jordan, of all places, then my hopes are pretty dim for any meaningful Israeli cooperation with its Arab neighbors. Israel should support steps (like reliable electricity) that will stabilize its moderate, peaceful, pro-western neighbor. 

There is one detail Mr. Beilin omits, and this is where America's position becomes complicated. The US recently completed an important nuclear deal with the UAE, giving Abu Dhabi civilian nuclear technology in return for a waiving of its right to enrich uranium domestically. Israel would like to see Jordan also waive this right, which Jordan understandably wants to retain. However, if America signs on a deal that gives Jordan the technology while allowing it to retain the right to enrich, it could sink the UAE deal. From the June 12 Wall Street Journal:

The Obama administration views the U.A.E. deal as a model for its nonproliferation drive. American experts say it would be virtually impossible for the Emirates or any other nation to develop atomic weapons without the ability to produce highly enriched uranium at home. 

The White House has good reason to stick to its guns in its talks with Jordan: the U.A.E., in its agreement with the U.S., won the right to negotiate a new deal if another Mideast country concludes a nuclear pact with the U.S. on more favorable terms (emphasis added).

Here's America's dilemma. If we force Jordan to renounce its right to domestic enrichment, we anger a strong ally and possibly force it to get its technology from other nuclear powers (like Russia, China, or Pakistan). If the US does the right thing and gives Jordan nuclear technology without forcing it to waive its right, the UAE deal gets scrapped. The deal is an important part of the framework we are constructing in the Gulf now to isolate Iran and its rogue nuclear program, and its collapse would be a serious blow to that effort. The deal is also essential to the UAE's energy security. 

America has a good reason to seek Jordanian renunciation of enrichment - but it has nothing to do with Israeli security. If we continue to ask Jordan to waive its treaty-given rights, make sure the request is framed as an essential step to save the important UAE nuclear agreement. If our request for renunciation is seen as "the result of Israeli pressure," as Beilin suggests, we've done something wrong; it's about honoring our agreements elsewhere and continuing to isolate Iran.